After the Wave: What the New Congress Means for Trade, Tariffs and Oversight
Overview
Last week’s blue tsunami has shifted next Congress’ conversations surrounding trade and oversight. It will be weeks or months before the dust settles on the ramifications of the election, but below is a primer on what to expect in the near term.
Congress
Familiar faces are likely to return to the top of the dais in both chambers. Rep. Richie Neal (D-MA-01) is positioned to become Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee. The Trade Subcommittee will likely be chaired by either Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA-38), Rep. Terri Sewell (D-AL-07), or Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA-01). On the Senate side, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) will revert to Finance Committee Chair. It is unclear who will chair the Trade Subcommittee.
Sen. Wyden has already announced that he will use the Finance Committee to “reassert congressional authority over our country’s trade policy to bring down costs, end Trump’s disastrous and corrupt tariffs, reestablish critical trade partnerships, and hold trade cheats accountable.” Rep. Neal has further noted ‘price-hiking tariffs’ as a partial reason for the Democrats’ victories on election night.
At this time, Democrats’ trade policy will likely take the form of oversight and legislative reform:
On oversight, Democrats will likely target Department of Commerce (Commerce) Secretary Howard Lutnick and related actions on company specific agreements, including critical mineral deals and government investment stakes in projects. Involved agencies will likely include the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Commerce. One likely point of inquiry is the Kazakh tungsten deal, which raised Democrat oversight questions ahead of the October recess.
There will also be interest in the Office of U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) bilateral trade arrangements, including the terms of the agreements and commitments made by partner countries. Related investigations will likely run through the committees of jurisdiction and the Oversight committees.
Turning to legislation, tariff reform will likely be on the Democrats’ 100-day agenda, including possible repeal of Section 338 (the basis of the Canada tariffs) and Section 122 (the basis of the 10 percent global tariffs) tariff authorities. Other trade authority reform, including Section 301 and Section 232 tariff reform, will likely not fall in the first 100 days. Following years of Section 232 tariffs on aluminum and steel, Democratic lawmakers will be balancing domestic interests with increased scrutiny of limited investment and capacity expansion.
Trade & Global Relations
On the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, there has been reporting of an alleged softening in U.S.-Canada relations, which could manifest in a trade deal or further changes to the Section 338 tariffs. Similarly, Mexico has been seeking Section 232 metals relief. Some reports suggest that Sec. Lutnick remains an obstacle, but we’re cautiously optimistic for changes ahead of the end of year, in alignment with USTR Amb. Jamieson Greer’s original timeline for interim agreements.
Turning to Asia, President Donald Trump will first meet with Australia, India, and Japan via the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue during the November 15-18 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting. Notably, the U.S.-India trade deal remains pending. Maintaining strong relationships with Australia and Japan remain top of mind as Japan continues to invest in the U.S., and both countries play a role in friendshoring critical mineral supply chains. President Trump will then visit Shenzhen for APEC on November 18-19, where he may have a trilateral meeting with Russia and China.
Within South America, Brazil still faces a cumulative 37.5 percent tariff rate – a result of the Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s unfair practices, as well as the broader, forced labor Section 301 investigation. Brazil recently saw the reelection of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who has had a tumultuous relationship with President Trump. Despite President Lula retaining the presidency, Brazil now has a divided government, with multiple members of the Bolsonaro family winning seats in the National Congress.
Finally, USTR has been increasingly aggressive in its messaging surrounding the EU, soliciting feedback on the impact of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism on U.S. trade and businesses, raising concerns about the European Investment Bank Airbus loan, and flagging an EU fishing regulation as an example of “burdensome documentation.” Taken together, these USTR statements cast doubt on the stability of the Turnberry agreement.
Tariffs: What’s Up in the Air?
Section 232 Tariffs
The Administration has implemented Section 232 tariffs on a number of sectors, including steel, aluminum, and copper; and semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
On aluminum, the Administration advanced an investment incentive program, allowing companies that are onshoring primary aluminum production to import primary aluminum at a quantity that corresponds to the facility’s projected output rate at half the Section 232 rate as construction is ongoing. Despite continued tariffs, 15,000 tons of Venezuelan aluminum entered Louisiana at the beginning of October, and a similar shipment is anticipated ahead of the end of the year.
On copper, Commerce’s Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) is rumored to be considering further inclusions for copper derivative products ahead of the end of the year.
The administration recently issued proclamations in the Section 232 investigations into wind turbines and robotics and industrial machinery, declining to impose immediate tariffs in either instance. However, the administration’s Section 232 proclamation on polysilicon imposed both tariffs and a novel minimum import price, which are slated to go into effect on December 4.
The administration is also continuing to advance the directives laid out in the Section 232 investigation into critical minerals, though no formal plurilateral negotiations have commenced.
Section 301 Tariffs
USTR currently has an open investigation into structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors, examining the following 16 economies: China, E.U., Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India. This investigation has been rumored to be a sticking point in negotiations with China and India. The results of this investigation are anticipated as soon as the week of November 9.
Section 301 tariffs are typically stackable and are not statutorily capped, meaning the Administration has authority to set a percentage rate as they see fit. The Administration has suggested the Section 301 country-specific tariff rates could match the previously-imposed tariff rates under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Other Import Restrictions
In July, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) instituted an import ban on foreign-made power inverters and advanced robotic devices. Notably, all countries were covered – not just foreign entities of concern (FEOC).
We are also awaiting action on the bulk-power system executive order, which could lay the groundwork for further product bans, as well as a rumored forthcoming Chinese optical transceiver ban. On the former, the Department of Energy has until December 24, 2026 to publish rules and regulations implementing the order.
In light of recent and rumored FCC actions, House Energy & Commerce Committee leadership released a bipartisan bill, the Communications & Technology Transparency Act of 2026 (H.R. 10453), to increase oversight and institute guardrails on FCC action. While there has yet to be a Senate companion bill, conversations will likely continue into next session.
